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RECENT IMPORTANT DECISIONS
AT'tORNr:Y AT LAW-DISBAIWl1:NT-D1st.0YALTY.-Margolis was admitted
to the bar in 1910 and in disbarment proceedings he admitted he was an
anarchist, a syndicalist, a communist, a Bolshevik, an I. W. W. and a member of the Union of Russian Workers. He had aided in the distribution
through the mails of an anti-war magazine, was active in the organization
of the Anti-Conscription League, and encouraged others to violate the laws
of the land. He was disbarred, and although he had not been convicted under any statute, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania affirmed the order, saying :-"He was actively participating in efforts to nullify the law" and that
its standard of professional integrity for lawyers was not satisfied by such
conduct as merely enables them to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
In Re Margolis (Penna., 1920), n2 Atl. 478.
An attorney is liable to the summary jurisdiction of the court for misconduct, and subject to disbarment. Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265. The proceeding is not for the purpose of punishment of the attorney, but for the
purpose of preserving the courts of justice from the official ministration of
persons unfit to practice in them. Jn, Re Thatchier, 212 Fed. 8o1. In 1863 the
California Court in a case involving a somewhat similar question said:-"The
right (to practice law) is subject to the condition that the attorney shall
possess a blameless moral character. The public have a right to demand
that no person shall be permitted to aid in the administration of justice
whose character is tainted with dishonesty, corruption, crime, and we will
add, disloyalty, or treasonable acts. The safety of the government and the
security of popular rights depend, in a great degree, upon the purity of the
bench and bar. If treason is allowed to find its advocates among their members, the very existence of the government and the liberties of the people
are endangered." Cohen v. Wright, 22 Cal. 297, 321. During the past few
years the courts have again been compelled to protect themselves from disloyal servants, and the court, In Re Wiltsie, 109 Wash. 26!, says that the
unprofessional solicitation of the business of preparing questionnaires and
claims of exemption, under the Selective Service Act, and the filing of false
claims of exemption, are flagrantly unethical, as well as disloyal, and evidence
a degree of moral turpitude, authorizing disbarment of an attorney at law.
In a later case, In Re Arctander, 188 Pac. 381, (Wash., 1920), an attorney
charged each registrant under the Selective Service Law $5.00 for assisting
in preparing questionnaires and assisting two hundred registrants in withdrawing papers declaring intention to become citizens. His conduct was held
disloyal, mercenary, unethical, and unprofessional, and to warrant disbarment under the American Bar Association's Code of Ethics. See also In Re
O'Reilley, 176 N. Y. Supp. 781. The courts have not hesitated to grapple
with a practical problem in a sane way and would seem to indicate that they
(in Dean Wigmore's words) have not been entirely "shocking in obstuse
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indifference to the vital issues at stake in August, 1918," and give us confidence in their ability successfully to meet "pending and coming issues."
BROKER· VF.NDOR's KNOWI.EDGE OF Hts INSTRUMEN'l'ALITY NO'J.' NECESSARY.
-The plaintiff. a real estate broker sought to recover certain commissions
from the defendant, claimed to be due the plaintiff for obtaining and furnishing a tenant for the defendant. The trial court refused an instruction to the
effect that if the owner at the time of the sale did not know of the broker's
instrumentality in procuring the purchaser, the broker could not recover.
Held, there was no error. McCready v. Nicholson (Mich., 1921), 182 N. W. 54The Michigan Court in the first opportunity it has had to pass on this
question rejects the Minnesota doctrine that "to entitle the broker to a commission where there is no exclusive agency, it must appear that the owner
knew, or ought to ha-..:e known from the circumstances that the broker was
instrumental in inducing the purchaser to enter into the contract," Quist v.
Goodfellow, 99 Minn. 509, and follows the great weight of authority that a
broker is entitled to a commission on a sale of real estate if he is the procuring cause of the sale, and "it is wholly unimportant whether the vendor
knew that his purchaser was sent by the broker or not. It is sufficient
if that was the fact, and he was not misled by the agent," Adams v. Decker,
34 Ill. App. 17; Lloyd v. Matthews, 51 N. Y. 124 For complete citation of
cases see 8 L. R. A. (N. S.) 153, Not~, .and 9 Ann. Cas. 431, Note. The test
as laid down by the Michigan Court: ''Was the "broker the procuring cause of
the sale or lease?" seems sufficient in itself to settle the question. If he was,
it seems immaterial whether the vendor knew of it or not. The broker rendered a service and should receive his pay. Of course it is an easy thing for
a real estate agent to conceive that he is the procuring cause of a sale of
real estate-especially of valuable real estate-but at the same time a good
many vendors seem not at all unwilling to accept the services of a real estate
man's advertising, and then having secured a buyer, slip out without much
more than a "Thank You." The Minnesota rule protects the vendor as
against the real estate man by insisting on publicity, and causes the broker
to put in his appearance before the sale, rather than, as has often happened,
some days later. This seems to be a difficulty which should be left to a
jury to be dealt with as a question of fact, viz., to ascertain whether the
broker was the procuring cause of the sale; and not a question to be determined by reference to a standard set up by law. For a discussion as to procuring cause see 44 L. R. A. 321, Note.
CoNS'l.'1'1.'U'l'IONAL LAW-IMPAIRMENT oF CoN'l.'RAC'l'S-ARBI'l'RA'l'ION LAW.The Arbitration Law (Laws of New York, 1920, Chap. 275), providing for
arbitration when agreed upon in the contract between the parties held constitutional. It strengthens rather than impairs the obligation of a contract,
and therefore does not violate Article I, Sec. ro, ch. I of the Federal Constitution relating to impairment of contracts. Berkovitz, et al. v. Arbib &
Houlberg, Inc., (N. Y., 1921), 130 N. E. 288.
A statute may not be declared unconstitutional for giving an additional
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remedy, or enlarging or making more efficient an existing remedy for the
enforcement of a contract. National Surety Co. v. Architectural Decorating
Co., 226 U.S. 276. For other cases to the same effect see 17 L. R. A. (N. S.)
779. In the principal case the remedy was not enlarged, but the statute made
available two remedies when formerly there was but one on the contract.
There was in the contract an agreement to arbitrate, but until the passage
of the law in question, it was unenforceable. The only remedy before the
~aw was an action for a breach, but after the law there was the additional
remedy upon the agreement to arbitrate. Thus the law provided a remedy
for the enforcement of an agreement to arbitrate which was unenforceable
under the e..'Cisting law when made. It would seem clear that the mere addition of a second remedy would strengthen or at least not impair the obligations of a contract so as to be unconstitutional. That authority as well as
reason support the principal case, see Gross v. U. S. Mortgage Co., 108 U. S.
477; Ewell v. Daggs, 1o8 U. S. 143, and other cases 12 CoRPus Jmus, I07o,
note 86. By this law the court is not deprived of jurisdiction, but the time
and manner of its exercise are adapted to the convention of the parties restricting the media of proof, and if after the decision of the arbitrator the
parties refuse to accept it, then the court will carry out the enforcement of
the decision accoi;ding to the contract.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-MONOPOr.ttS-BAStBALL CLUB IS NOT ENGAGED IN

"TRADE" OR "COMMERCE." - The Baltimore Club of the disbanded Federal
League brought an action for damages under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act
against the National and American Leagues and the members of the National Commission. It claimed that because of the reserve clause in the baseball players' contracts under the National Agreement the Federal League was
unable to secure suitable players which caused its dissolution, and the plaintiff being without competition ceased to operate. Plaintiff asserted that the
disbandment of the Federal League with the resulting interference with its
interstate "trade" and "commerce" and the consequent injury was due to the
acts of the defendants done in violation of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.
Held, the business of giving exhibitions of baseball games for profit is not
trade or commerce and the reserve clause in baseball players' contracts was
only indirect and incidental in its effect on the interstate commerce of a club
outside the National Agreement, so that it does not amount to a violation
of the Sherman Anti-Trust Act. National League of Professional Baseball
Clubs, et al. v. Federal Baseball Club. of Baltinwre, Inc., 26<} Fed. 681.
The court, in arriving at this conclusion, held that the act complained of
must affect directly and not merely in an indirect or incidental manner the
interstate commerce, for the Sherman Act to be applicable. Loewe v. Lawlor,
2o8 U. S. 274; Northern Securities Co. v. United States, 193 U. S. I97· It
then found that the reserve clause was intended only to protect the rights
of the clubs operating under the agreement to retain their players, and so
had only an indirect effect upon the plaintiff, and therefore was not prohibited by the law. The decision of the case placed upon this ground is cor-
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rect but the dictum that a baseball club is not engaged in "trade'' or "commerce" seems inconsii:tent with cases previously decided. In arriving at the
dictum that such a club ts not engaged in "trade" or "commerce," the court
relied upon Metropolitan Opera Co. v. Hammerstein, 147 N. Y. Supp. 535;
In re Oriental Society, Bankrupt, 104 Fed. 975; American Baseball Club of
Chicago v. Chase, 149 N. Y. Supp. 6. These cases dwell upon the fact that
baseball or theatrical performances are not trade or commerce, but are sport
or amusement. In these cases either the performances were almost always
to be given in the same state or else the court failed to notice any distinction.
The court jn the principal case notes that the transmission of books and instructions by a correspondence school into several states with replies thereto, was interstate commerce. International Text-Book Co. v. Pigg, 217 U. S.
91. See also as within the law Marienelli v. United Booking Offices, 227 Fed.
165, where an actor's brokerage firm made contracts that actors were to perform at certain specified playhouses, and only at such, within the various
states in a certain section of the country. A correspondence school can conduct lessons by mail in its home city, or even throughout the State and it is
not engaged in interstate commerce. It might as a mere incident occasionally
send a sampie lesson outside the state, and yet not be so engaged, as here
the interstate feature would be only incidental. But when the lessons are
continually sent without the state, and replies received therefrom, and the
interstate practice becomes so important as to be an "essential," not-a mere
"incidental" element, then the school is engaged in interstate commerce.
International Ten-Book Co. v. "Pigg (supra), so holds. The fact of monopoly was unquestioned in the principal case, and the court based their dictum
upon the fact that there was no "trade" or "commerce." To continue the
interest and make a large professional ball club a financial success, it is
necessary that there be a league. And to be a league, it is necessary that
half the games be played away from home on the opponents' fields, these
fields of the opposing clubs being located in from two to seven different
states from that of the home of the team, according to the League. Therefore, does it not seem that when a baseball player signs to play not only at
the home grounds, but on the fields of the other league members as well,
in view of the decision last cited, and in spite of "what the court found, the
contract has the interstate feature as such an "essential" element as to come
within the Sherman Anti-Trust Act? As was said in Butler Bros. Shoe Co.
v. U. S. Rubber Co., 84 c:c. A. and cited in Ten-Book Co. v. Pigg (supra)
when holding contracts themselves which were concerned with interstate business as interstate commerce, "All interstate commerce is not. sales of goods.
Importation into one state ·from another is the indispensable element, the
test of interstate commerce; and every negotiation, contract, trade and dealing between citizens of different states which contemplates and causes such
importation, whether it be of goods, persons or information is a transaction
of interstate commerce." It is only reasonable that the players' contracts
contemplated that they be transported around the different states to the
various cities of the league. The interstate travel of the ball players is so
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"essential" an elemerit of their contract as to make it interstate commerce.
What was said in Marienelli v. United Booking Offices of America (supra)
is almost equally applicable to the principal case, "Undeniably certain aspects
of the business are interstate commerce, as, for instance, the contracts made
by the booking companies under which the performers must go from state
to state, throughout the circuit, acting here and there, and fulfilling their
contracts as much by the travel as by the acting."
CoNsT1TuTioNAL LAw-RtNT Rr:Gur,ATION UNDI>R Poucs Powmt. - The
New York Rents Laws and the Ball Rent Law enacted by Congress for the
District of Columbia were passed upon by the Supreme Court of the United
States on April 18. Held, (four justices dissenting)-the business of housing may be "affected with a public interest," and subject to regulation under
the police power of the state. Brown Holding Co. v. Feldman, (No. 731,
U. S. S. C., April 18, 1921); Block v. Hirsh, (No. 640, U. S. S. C., April
18, 1921).
The details of this legislation and the general principles determinative of
its constitutionality are discussed at some length in 19 MICH. L. Rm. 599.
The decision is the logical development of Munn v. Illinois, 94 U. S. II3,
and the more recent pronouncement of the same doctrine in German Alliance
Insur. Co. v. Lewis, 233 U. S. 38g. Distinctions are suggested, both in the
dissenting opinion in the principal cases, and elsewhere, but none which
cannot easily be disposed of. It is suggested that the conditions assigned
as the basis for regulation of the housing industry are temporary and artificial, whereas the conditions justifying the regulation of rates for fire insurance and grain elevators are permanent and natural. Further, it is contended that the chief limitation hitherto placed upon the doctrine is transgressed by the rent legislation, namely, the right to quit business at any
time the owner desires. As to the first distinction it may be answered that
it can at most be only a consideration relating to policy. Legislative protection has been extended and upheld as against artificial monopolies, and natural monopolies. Why should the power be denied to combat a new economic anomaly, certainly far more serious in its immediate aspect than many
of the others, namely, the temporary shortage of a necessary of life, malcing
possible the charging of extortionate prices? The power is the same. The
basis on which it rests is the same: the need of relief from economic oppression where the public is otherwise helpless. Justice Holmes arrives at
the same conclusion in Block v. Hirsh, supra, by another method of approach. "If to answer one need,'' he says, "the legislature may limit height
to answer another it may limit rent. * * * The reasons are of a different
nature but they certainty are not less pressing." This also involves only a
perception of substance as distinct from form, and a recognition of the
unity of the police power, in its varying applications. To the objection that
the landlord cannot retire from the business of renting as the owner of the
elevator may retire from storing grain, Justice Holmes replies that in the
case of public utilities particularly, the right of quitting is ittusory at best,

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
and further that the regulation is of a temporary duration only. It may be
added that if the landlord desires the house for his own use he can get it
under the rent legislation, and it is difficult to sympathize with landlords
for the loss of the right to let houses remain empty, rather than to accept
reasonable returns from the property. Widespread objection to the rent
decisions has been made, particularly in the dissenting opinions on the
ground of danger of possible extensions of the decisions. Do they really
mean, however, that shoelaces and chewing-gum are now subject to regulation or that even rentals may be regulated in future under any and all conditions? '!'he Supreme Court has tried hard to say that it does not, that
there really is some significance to the phrase "business clothed with a public interest." It is said that the regulation is justified because housing is a
necessary of life, and a shortage exists. Such conditions obviously have not
always existed nor will they always exist. Is the court entirely helpless when
the legislature says that they do exist? Courts declare limitations of policy
in other cases, and clearly can do so here. An outstanding feature of the
recent decisions is the defection of Mr. Justice McKenna who rendered the
dissenting opinions. "If such power exist what is its limit," he asks, "and
what its consequences?
'!'he wonder comes to us, what will the country
do with its new freedom?" No better answer can be made than that which
the Justice himself has already given in German Alliance .Insur. Co. v. Lewis,
Sf1pra. "But it is said that the reasoning of the opinion has the broad reach
of subjecting to regulation every act of human endeavor and the price of
every article of human use. We might without much concern leave our discussion to take care of itself against such misunderstanding or deductions.
Against that conservatism of the mind which puts to question every
new act of regulating legislation and regards the legislation as invalid or
dangerous until it has become familiar, government-state and nationalhas pressed on in the general welfare and our reports are full of cases
where in instance after instance the exercise of regulation was resisted and
yet sustained against attacks asserted to be justified by the Constitution of
the United States. '!'he dread of the moment having passed, no one is now
heard to say that rights were restrained or their c9nstitutional guarantees
impaired.'' See also 19 MICH. L. Rtv. 74-

***

***

CoNSTITUTIONAr. LAw-STATES AND FEJ>:eRAr. GoVJ>RNM:tmT-Co-OP:eRA'l'ION

WAR-'I'n.n: L~ISI.A'l'ION.-Defendant was convicted for violation of a
Minnesota statute making it unlawful to interfere with, or discourage the
enlistment of men in the military or naval service of the United States or
the state, or to advocate non-participation in the carrying on of the war.
'!'he case came before the Federal Supreme Court through proceedings in
error, after the Supreme Court of Minnesota had affirmed the conviction.
'!'he federal question presented was whether or not the power of Congress
to legislate concerning the same subject-matter was exclusive. Held, statutes in aid of the federal legislation, and not in conflict therewith can stand,
IN
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and the Minnesota statute falls within the class. Gilbert v. Minnesota, (U. S.
S. Ct., Adv. Opinions, Jan. 15, 1921, p. 146).
The decision is featured by a strong dissent on the part of Mr. Justice
Brandeis chiefly on the ground that Congress has exclusive power to legislate concerning the Army and Navy of the United States, and to declare
war. He concludes, therefore, that the field is closed to the states even in
the absence of federal legislation, and that here, in any event, the Federal
Espionage Law constituted such an entrance into the field as to preclude
state action. The majority of the court holds that technical considerations
and language cannot govern; that state and national interests are so interwoven in carrying on war as to give the former the power to render legislative aid. The decision seems sound. The principles governing the exclusiveness of federal power in particular cases have been worked out to some
extent in the fields of commerce and bankruptcy. It was early settled in
both that the grants to the Federal Government were not exclusive in all
cases, in the absence of federal action. Sturges v. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat.
122; Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 12 How. 299. The view sanctioned, was
that the grant without action is exclusive. only where uniformity is required.
In the field of bankruptcy there seems to have been considerable doubt at
first as to whether any state legislation remained operative after the passage
of a federal act. 45 L. R. A. 177. The rule now seems settled, however, that
state laws may stand even though the federal act covers the same ground
if they do not conflict therewith, and are in aid of the general policy. Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U. S. 6o5. A partial entrance into the field under the
power to regulate commerce does not put an end to state legislation where
there is no need for uniformity. Reid v. Colorado, 187 U. S. 137. The principle which should govern seems clear. Both state and federal governments
have no purpose but to promote welfare, and ordinarily what promotes the
welfare of one does so for the other. Where this ceases to be true, the
line should be drawn, and only there. A statute prohibiting the debasement
of the flag to trade uses, has been sustained on the ground that fostering a
feeling of patriotism toward the nation necessarily promotes the welfare of
the state. Halter v. Nebraska, 205 U. S. 34 But where uniformity is absolutely essential, state and national welfare in the narrow sense, cease to be
identical, and the former must of course yield. There the absence of any
legislation by Congress may well be made the basis for a presumption that
the paramount legislative policy is against it. Elsewhere, as in the principalcase, the power of the states should be checked only when there is a real
conflict, not a mere occupation of the same field.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-VALIDITY OF ORDINANCE TO Pxevr:NT "SCALPrnG'' OF
TH!>ATR£ TICKF;TS.-A San Francisco ordinance makes it unlawful to engage
in the business of re-selling theatre tickets without a license, costing $300.oo
a month. Having been arrested for violating this ordinance, Dees sought
his release by a writ of habeas corpus, on the ground that the ordinance was
unconstitutional. Held, the ordinance as a revenue measure is unreasonable
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and oppressive; as an exercise of the police power it is an unwarranted interference with the liberty of citizens; petitioner discharged. Ex parte Dees
(Cal., 192()), 194 Pac. 717.
In the principal case the license tax imposed was $300.00 a month, while
the gross income from the petitioner's business was but $6oo.oo a month.
The court rightfully held it oppressive, unreasonable and prohibitory, and,
being such, invalid. Moreover such a license tax for revenue was forbidden
by the Charter of San Francisco. It was properly recognized that the ordinance purporting to be a revenue measure was in fact an attempted exercise
of the police power. This was made clear not only by the excessive rate of
the license fee but also by reason of the ordinance making engaging in this
business alone, unlawful, unless with a license. The question really becomes
then, whether this ordinance was a proper exercise of the police power. That
the business of selling theatre tickets at a profit is no more immoral nor
injurious to the public welfare or convenience than is the sale of any article
of merchandise at a profit, is the opinion expressed in Ex parte Quarg, 149
Cal. 81. In every state in which the question has been before the courts,
statutes prohibiting the scalping of theatre tickets have been held unconstitutional, Ex parle Quarg, supra; People y. Steele, 231 Ill. 340; People v. Newman, l8o N. Y. S. 8g2. Speculation in theatre tickets is considered a lawful
occupation and statutes prohibiting it,_ to violate the due process clause. On
the ground that the business is proper, ·neither immoral nor injurious to the
public, it was held in these cases to be an improper exercise of the police
power to prohibit or unreasonably regulate or interfere with such sales. To
do so is declared an unwarranted interference with the liberty of the citizen,
not based upon a reasonable consideration of the public health, morals, safety, or welfare, nor of the cost of police supervision. In re Dees (Cal.), l8g
Pac. 1050. Statutes forbidding railroad ticket scalping have been held valid in
nearly every state. Burdick v. People, 149 Ill. 6oo; Fry v. State, 63 Ind. 552.
New York alone has refused to recognize the validity of such a statute.
People v. Warden, 157 N. Y. u6. The distinction drawn between statutes
dealing with theatre and railroad tickets, is that the railroad is a business
affected with a public interest and the public welfare requires its regulation
by means of the police power, while a theatre is a private business not so
affecting the welfare of the public as to demand police regulation. PP.ople v.
Steele, supra. It is submitted that the theatre is a business clothed with a
public interest, coming within the requirements set out in Mu11n v. Illinois,
94 U. S. u3, as property used in a manner so as to make it of public consequence and affect the community at large. The moving picture theatre is
regulated under the police power by license and censorship, because it is a
fit subject for regulation. The courts must recognize the place of the modern
theatre and class it among those businesses which are affected with a public
interest and are subject to the 'police regulation.
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CoNTRACT-CusTOM AND UsAGE AS AFitr:CTING A WR.ITTF.N CoNTRACT.p made a contract with D, selling him 50,000 tons of coal to be shipped in
twelve equal monthly instalments. Coal was shipped but never the full
monthly quota. D paid for the coal as it was shipped for nine months but
refused to pay for the amount shipped during the last three m.onths. P
brings this action to recover the contract price for the coal delivered, averring, in answer to the claim of D for damages because of failure to deliver
the full monthly instalments, an established trade usage. That usage is that
all contracts for the sale and delivery of coal are shipped subject to the
contingency that the seller can obtain cars to ship the full amount he has
contracted to deliver. If sufficient cars cannot be obtained, the coal shipped
shall be appoitioned pro rata among the holders of contracts. P avers that
the contract between himself and D was intended to be subject to this usage
of the trade. Held, the trade usage averred is an incident annexed to and
incorporated by implication into the written contract; judgment for P.
Nicoll v. Pittsvein Coal Co. (C. C. A., 211d Circ., 1920), 26\j Fed. g68.
The paror evidence rule in principle does not permit a written contract
to be altered, contradicted or varied by parol evidence. Nichols v. Godts,
10 Exch. 191; Wu.LISTON, CoNTRACTS, § 631. But among, the exceptions to
this rule is the admission of parol evidence to establish a trade usage or a
custom, with reference to which the written contract was made. Humfrey
v. Dale, 7 E. & B. 266. Usually the distinction between custom and trade
usage is disregarded. Custom is a usage which has become law by long and
uniform practice. It is part of the common law. Wills v. Bailey, 49 N. Y.
464; Eames v. Claflin Co., 239 Fed. 631; WU.LISTON, CONTRACTS,§ 649. Usage
or trade usage derives its efficacy from the assent of the parties. If the usage
is proved, it enters into the obligations of the parties. Usage may be proved
to show that words of a clear meaning were used in the contract in a different sense. Soper v. Tyler, 77 Conn. 104 Or usage may be shown not only
to elucidate the contract, but for the purpose of completing it by annexing
incidents to it. The Delaware, 14 Wall. 579. When tradesmen make a contract they, without thinking of the matter, write on the basis of a large number of customs or trade usages which they take as a matter of course. They
set down in the -contract only those terms necessary to be determined in
that case by specific agreement, leaving to implication those general and unvarying incidents which a uniform usage of the trade would annex. Humfrey v. Dale, supra. If nothing is said concerning the usage, it naturally
is included. If the parties wished to exclude the application of the usage,
they would naturally exclude it in express terms. Hostetter v. Park, 137
U. S. 30; J ol:nsoti v. Norcross, 209 Mass. 445. The intention not to adopt
the usage in the written contract may also be shown by the circumstances or
the· construction of the whole contract. It depends largely on the facts of
each case. Moore v. United States, 1g6 U. S. 157. It need not be excluded
in direct terms necessarily. The usage to be valid must be reasonabfo and
legal, Eames v. Claflin Co., supra. It is often said the usage must be general but this goes rather to the question of whether the parties contracted
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with reference to the usage. WILI.ISTON ON CONTRACTS, § 66o. The party
seeking to establish the usage must show the other was aware of the usage
or that the usage was so well defined and so generally adopted by those in
the trade, that he ought to have known of it. Rastetter v. Reynolds, 16o Ind.
133; Black v. Ashley, 8o Mich. go. Whether the usage exists is a matter of
fact for the jury, as also is the question whether the parties have adopted
the usage. ChM:ago Co. v. Tilton, 87 Ill. 547; Scott v. Brown, 6o N. Y. S.
5n. In the principal case the trade usage alleged by P complies with the
requirements of reasonableness and legality and was known to D. For nine
months D conformed to the usage. This was evidence of the usage as well
as of D's knowledge and intention of contracting subject to the usage. The
court and jury properly found that the usage existed, was adopted by the
parties and became a part of their contract.
CoNTRACTs-"INFORMATION" AS TR~ CoNSmJ>RATION FOR A CoNTRACT.Plaintiff told defendant's officials that he had acquired information which
would be of great value if used in the operation of defendant railroad.
Thereupon the officials agreed that if plaintiff would submit his proposition
and if the same ;was acted upon they would pay plaintiff 5% of the proceeds. Plaintiff submitted his proposition, to-wit: "The selling of advertising space in .railroad stations, cars, etc." Although the road had been
in operation several decades, this idea. had never occurred to the defendant's
officials as a source of revenue. The idea was used and advertising space sold
with profit, but defendant refused to pay plaintiff his commissions. In an
action on the contract, held, the contract was fatally defective for want of
consideration. Masline v. N. Y., N. H. & H. R. Co. (Conn., 1921), u2
Atl. 639.
This is a case of first impression, though the applicable underlying principles are well settled. The court's decision is based on the theory that
when one offers "information" as consideration for a contract the information must consist of nothing less than new ideas, not known to the promiser
and not generally known to the world at large. But since selling advertising space for profit is a well known commercial enterprise, the plaintiff had
proferred nothing more substantial than a "bare idea," valueless as consideration. As authority to substantiate its position the court cited Stein v.
Morris, 120 Va. 390, and Bristol v. Equitable Life Assurance Societ~,r, 5 N. Y.
Supp. 131, but in each of these cases the plaintiff was seeking to protect an
idea as properly against its use by one who, having fortuitously learned of
the idea, used it. No question of contract was involved and hence the decisions cannot properly be regarded as decisive of the facts of the principal
case. Considerable reliance was also placed upon synonyms given for "information" in Murray's "New English Dictionary," namely "news" and "intelligence." But synonyms are dangerous and must be used with caution.
A far more accurate definition is the one actually given for the word in the
same source, namely, "Information is that which one is told." Everyday
usage treats the term in this light, and non-technical terms in contracts should
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be given a construction in accord with common usage. Such a strainer! construction of the word permits the promisor to obtain relief against his own
lack of foresight. Although actually intending to pay for whatever suggestions of value the plaintiff may make, he can refuse to pay, if, when the
suggestions are received, he finds that, had he been more alert himself, he
might have been the author of them. Yet it is elementary that a court will
not permit the adequacy of considera.tion to be questioned so long as it is
regarded at the time of the making of the contract as the equivalent of the
promise. Haigh v. Brooks, 10 A. & E. 309. Furthermore the actual value
of the information imparted in the principal case is a cogent argument in
favor of applying the ordinary rules of construction and the ordinary laws
of consideration to "information" and treating it as sufficient, whether composed of commonly known ideas· or not, if actually given as the equivalent
of the promise.
CONTRAC'.rs -

Soos'l'AN'l'IAL PSRFoR.MANC$ oF CoNDI'l'ION Pimcr:DtN'l'. -

P

agreed to build a residence for D, final payment to be preceded by architect's
certificate. Specifications for plumbing work called for all wrought iron
pipe to be well galvanized, lap welded, of the grade known as standard
pipe of "Reading'' manufacture. Nine months after the work was finished,
but before final payment, D discovered that some of the pipe used was of
other than "Reading'' manufacture. The departure from specifications was
due to unexplained fault of a subcontractor. The pipe used was equal in
every way to "Reading'' pipe. Architect's certificate was refused until the
deviation from the contract should be remedied, which would involve great
expense. P brought action for balance due. Held, allowance for breach
should be not the cost of replacement, but the difference in value which
would be nominal. Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, (N. Y., 1921), 129 N. E. 88g.
The rule of substantial performance has been varioµsly stated but in
essence is to the effect that the breach must not be such as to interfere seriously with the contract purpose. Anderson v. Pringle, 79 Minn. 433. In the principal case it is hard to perceive any purpose, reasonable or unreasonable,
which was defeated by the absence of the "Reading'' trade-mark. The breach
must not be fraudulent, willful, or intentional; the contractor must make an
honest attempt to perform exactly. Ashley v. He11ahan, 56 Ohio St. 559.
But one case has been found in which negligence alone has been held to preclude recovery, and in that case the entire contract was negligently performed. John R. Carpenter Co. v. Ellsworth, 136 N. Y. Supp. I08. With
due deference to the dissenting opinion in the instant case, which was based
chiefly upon P's negligence as constituting bad faith, it is submitted that in
the great majority of cases where contracts have been held substantially
performed the breaches have been due to negligence. The inference would
seem almost unavoidable that in performing a contract including thousands
of specifications the contractor has made an honest effort if he has failed in
only one detail and that failure involving no benefit to himself. The allowance to be made for the breach, as sometimes stated, is the amount required
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to put the work in the condition the contract called for. Ashley v. H enahan,
supra. More often it is said that the defendant shall be allowed full compensation for all damages suffered. Aetna Iron & Steel Works v. Kossuth
County, 79 Ia. 40. In many cases the quantum of allowance would be the
same. But in others, as in the principal case, where the expense of remedying the breach is decidedly out of proportion to the good attained, the rule
of damages becomes vital To apply the strict rule would be to admit the
doctrine of substantial performance in words but deny it in substance. For
full discussion see 2 WII.LlSTON ON CONTRACTS,§ 1342, and 24 L. R. A. (N. S.)
327.

EAsgMENTs-Ex'tINGUlSHJ.ntNT BY Vor..uNTARY Di;smucnoN oF SERVlENT
TuNEMENT.-In 1852 the owners of adjacent lots constructed thereon a threestory building having a common entrance, stairways, and landings as sole
means of access to the upper stories. Petitioner: (for registration of land
title), who has derived title to one of the lots, now proposes to remove his
part of the building and rebuild without provision for continuing the existing access to the respondent's part. Held, although respondent has an easement through petitioner's building, gained by prescription, the easement may
be extinguished by the voluntary destruction of the servient tenement. Union
Nat. Bank of Lowell v. Nesmith, (Ma~s., l9:n), 130 N. E. 251.
It is well settled that destruction of the servient tenement without fault
of the owner extinguishes the easement. Shirley v. Crabb, 138 Ind. 200. That
voluntary destruction has the same effect appears rather startling. The majority holding in the instant case is based on dicta in Hubbell v. Warren, 8
Allen 173, and Catting v. City of Boston, 201 Mass <:17, and the court's finding
as to the intentions of the parties, viz., that the right should remain only
so long as each party should desire to ·maintain his part of the building. It
may be doubted seriously if the parties intended any such speculation. Some
reasonable men, at" least, would not care to leave the sole means of access
to two-thirds of a building to the pleasure of an adjoining land owner. In
the principal case, perhaps, no great loss was suffered by the respondent because of the age of the building, but the result would be the same apparently
if the building were newly constructed. If the court had found for the respondent in respect to the intended duration of the easement the somewhat
similar case of Adams v. Marshall, 138 Ma~s. 228, would indicate the likelihood of the respondent getting money damages rather than equitable protection of his easement. Seemingly the best explanation of the case lies in
the settled hostility of the Massachusetts courts toward easements in structures. McKenna v. Eato1i, 182 Mass. 346; Walker v. Stetson, 162 Mass. 86;
Allen. v. Evans, 161 Mass. 485.
EAs:EMENTS-SCOFt oF-R:rGH'l'S IN Icr: O:!i MILL-PoND.-Defendant had a
right to flowage over the p1aintiff's land. Plaintiff had been accustomed to
harvesting the ice forming thereon. The defendant with malice and with
the sole intent of preventing the plaintiff from. harvesting the ice opened the
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sluice-gates whereby the ice was destroyed. The plaintiff sues for the destruction of the ice. Held, the plaintiff being the owner of the la11d under
the pond had the right to harvest and sell the ice formed on the pond subject
to the defendant's right to the reasonable use of the water; and as the act
complained of was not reasonable the defendant was liable. Taft v. Bridgeto1i Worsted Co. (Mass., 1921), 130 N. E. 48.
The overwhelming weight of authority is in accord with the principal case
to the effect that the owner of the bed of the mill-pond has, as an incident to
that ownership, the right to cut the ice thereon, whenever the exercise of that
right d'oes not materially diminish the head of water to the detriment of the
mill-owner. Stevens v. Kelley (1886), 78 Me. 445; Eidmiller lr:e Co. v.
Guthrie (1894), 42 Neb. 238; Bigelow v. Shaw (1887), 65 Mich. 341. In
Myer v. Whittaker (1878), 55 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 376, an inferior court held
that the one entitled to the flowage rights owned the ice. It is apparent from
the opinion therein that the court considered that this right of flowage was
for all purposes absolutely and did not consider the right of flowage as
being limited to all purposes necessary to operate the mill. The court in
Myer v. Whittaker, supra, relied upon Mill River Woolen Mfg. Co. v. Smith
(1867), 34 Conn. 462, as supporting their holding. A later Connecticut court
however cited the same case as an authority for the view that title to the
ice was in the riparian proprietors. Howe v. Andrews (1892), 62 Conn. 3g8.
The whole matter seems to resolve itself into one question: what was the
scope of the easement granted to the.mill-owner? If the right of flowage
was for all purposes necessary for the operation of the mill the right of the
mill proprietor is qualified ; and the owner of the soil may harvest and sell
the ice so long as the mill-owner is not materially interfered with in the
operation of his plant. But on the other hand if the right given is for all
purposes, the mill-owner gets an absolute interest in the water subject only
to the rights of riparian proprietors below and could therefore, harvest the ice.
E.rtCTM1'NT-RxGHT oF V1'ND1'S oF ExiicuTORY LAND CoNTRACT ENTITI.t>n TO
PosstSSION-Vt>NDOR AND PURCHASSR.-P., the vendee in an executory land
contract, was ousted by D., the vendor, although not in default. P. brought
ejectment. Held, equitable ownership with right to possession is sufficient to
maintain ejectment. Kingsworth v. Baker, 213 Mich. 294
The principal case seems to be a departure both from the rules of the
common law requiring the legal title in the plaintiff to s~pport the action,
(La1igdot~ v. Sherwood, 124 U. S. 74; see note in 18 L. R. A. 781), and also
from the former Michigan cases such as Harrett v. Kinney, 44 Mich. 457;
Roman v. Lewis, 39 Mich. 233; and Carpmter v. Ingersoll, 43 Mich. 433; and
from the dif;ta in Geiges v. Gt'einer, 68 Mich. 153, and Whiting v. Butler, 29
Mich. 124 It is significant that a vendee under a mere contract to convey
was allowed to oust his vendor having the legal title from possession by ejectment. Even under the code abolishing the distinction between actions at
law and suits in equity, this remedy has been refused. Peck v. Newton, 46
Barb (N. Y.) 173. It would seem that under the court's decision the action
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of ejectment is likely to become the substitute ·for the suit in equity for
specific performance of agreements to convey, and that a big step toward
the enforcement of equitable rights in a court of law has been taken. The
cases cited by the court do not sustain its decision. While the result reached
in the principal case may be highly beneficial in securing a more solid legal
status to contract purchasers of land, in view of the fact that such ownership has become so wide-spread, yet in the absence of a declaration of the
state's policy by act of legislature the decision cannot but be regarded as
judicial legislation.
Er.ECTIONS-STATUTr:S REQUIRING E!,EC'l'()R TO STATE AGE Hn.D v AI.ID.Section 4go6 of the GENERA!, CoDE OF OHIO requires an applicant for registration as a qualified elector of a municipality to state his or her age in
years and months. The relator made application for registration, stating
that she was over 21 years of age, but refused to state her age in years and
months. Upon the refusal of the registrars to register her she brought this
application for a writ of mandamus to compel them to do so. She contends
that the section of the Code above referred to is unconstitutional, in that
it constitutes a denial or abridgement of the constitutional right of citizens
to vote conferred by Section 1, Article V of the Constitution of Ohio as
modified and controlled by the Nineteenth Amendment to the Constitution
of the United States. Held, that the· section in question was constitutional,
and therefore the application for the writ was denied. State e~ rel Kle1°n v.
Hillenbrand (Ohio, 1920), 130 N. E. 29.
Due to the Nineteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution and the
well known reluctance of woman to reveal her exact age the decision in the
instant case is interesting, although the law involved therein is so clear and
well settled that it seems startling that it could have been seriously questioned. It is no doubt true as pointed out in Monroe et al v. Collins, 17 Ohio
St. 665, that statutes which entirely exclude certain persons from voting because of race or color are unconstitutional. But it is equally true that the
Legislature may .regulate the exercise of the right to vote and may pass statutes requiring proof of the right, consistent with the right itself. Wood v.
Baker, 38 Wis. 71; Edmonds v. Banbury, 28 Iowa 267; Capen v. Foster, 12
Pick (Mass.) 485; Cothren v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279; Sotitherland v. Norris, 74
Md. 326. The authority of the Legislature to enact registration laws was
sustained and the limits of that power were enunciated by the Ohio court
in Daggett v. Hudson, 43 Ohio St. 548. So long as the statutes do not add
any new qualification to the voter other than those required by the Constitution, the statutes are1constitutiona1. See Pope v. Williams, 93 Md. 59, affirmed in 193 U. S. 6:u. In the instant case the statute did not unreasonably
or unnecessarily restraiit, impair, or impede the exercise of the right to vote
conferred by Sec. I, Art. V of the Constitution of Ohio, but rather provided
a reasonable, uniform, and impartial method of regulating, facilitating, and
securing the exercise of this right, and of preventing its abuse. It is submitted that if the registrars could not interrogate further than to ask the
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applicants if they were above the required age, the whole object and purpose
of the registration laws would be defeated.
HUSBAND AND Witt-ESTATts BY ENTIRE'rY-APPLICATION 'tO PiiltSONAL
PRottRTY.-ln order to obtain a loan, the husband and wife mortgaged land
which they held as tenants by the entirety. The husband was to deposit thfs
sum in their joint names, but without the lmowledge or consent of the wife
he deposited it in the bank in his own name. After his death, in a suit in
equity by the wife to recover the amount on deposit, it was held, that the
husband and wife had an estate by entirety in the funds, and that as survivor the wife was entitled to what remained on deposit. U11.Um & M ercantile Trust Co. v. Hudson, (Ark, I92I), 227 S. W. I.
The court expressly states that "tenancy by the entirety could and did
exist at common law in personal property." Such a doctrine seems entirely
inconsistent with the common law rule that a husband became by marriage
absolute owner of the wife's personal chattels and also of her chattels real
and choses in action when he reduced these into his possession. Co. LITT.
35I. See I BISHOP ON LAW OF MARRIED WoM'SN, Sec. 2n; 3 MICH. L. R'Sv.
668; 33 HARV. L. R'Sv. 983. Since by modern statutes married women are
given the right to own and control personal property, there would seem to be
no logical difficulty in applying the doctrine of tenancies by the entirety to
personalty. In spite oi the general tendency and desirability of abolishing
such antiquated common law institutions, a number of courts have recognized such estates in personal property. Re Bramberry's Estate, I56 Pa. St.
628; Re Kleiike's Estate, 2IO Pa. St. 572; Citizens' Sav. Bank and Trust Co.
v. J e11kins, 9I Vt. I3; Patton v. Rankin, 68 Ind. 245; Phelps v. Simons, I59
Mass. 4I5; Boland v. McKowen, I8g Mass. 563; Frost v. Frost, 200 Mo. 474;
George v. Dutto11!s Estate (Vt., I!)2o), Io8 Atl. 5I5. Other courts recognize
such estates in realty only. Wait v. Bovee, 35 Mich. 425; Morrill v. Morrill,
I38 Mich. n2; In re Albrecht, I36 N. Y. 9I; In re Baum, Io6 N. Y. Supp. u3,
commented upon in 6 MICH. L. R'Sv. 345. The application of the doctrine
of estates by the entirety to personalty and the authorities are welt discussed
in a note, 8 A. L. R. IOI7. See also 22 L. R. A. 594.
HusBAND AND WIFt-MARRIAG'S Hr:r.D ro R'SND'SR PSRFoRMANC'S oF Wm's
CoNTRACT FOR Snvicr:s lMPossmu:·.-In a suit for·specific performance of an
oral contract entered into before marriage, by which the plaintiff agreed to
nurse, care, and work for deceased and to marry him, in consideration that
he would convey to her, either by deed or will, all his property at his death.
Held, plaintiff could not recover. Boha1111a1i v. Maxwell (Ia., I92I), I8I
N. W.683.
There was no allegation or proof that the services contracted for were
services other than those to which the husband was entitled as husband.
The basis of the decision is that as the services contracted for were of the
kind to which the husband was entitled by reason of the marriage status, the
marriage made it impossible for the plaintiff to perform her contract. The
principles involved in these cases are discussed in I9 MICH. L. R'Sv. 207.
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INSURANcrr-Doss WINDSTORM Poucy CovsR Loss oF HoRSE FRIGHTENED
INTO FATAL INJURY BY CYCLONE-PROXIMATE CAuss.-D. insured P's property including horses from any loss or damage by windstorm, tornado, or
cyclone. During a violent windstorm P's horse, while in a barn, became
frightened, broke his halter, and was injured fatally. P. brought suit upon
the insurance policy. Held, the death of the horse was the proximate result
of the windstorm and so recovery may be had for the loss. Fidelity Ins. Co.
v. Anderson (Ind., I92I), I30 N. ~· 4I9.
The only question in the case was whether the injury to the horse was
the proximate result of the windstorm, or whether the fright of the horse
was an efficient intervening cause which broke the chain of causation. While
the facts seem to be unique in the law of insurance it would seem that
the case may be fairly compared on principle to the question whether injury
from fright is the proximate result of an act of a wrongdoer when there
is no impact. SUTHERLAND, DA'MAGES [4th Ed.] p. 77, et seq.; 34 HARV. L.
REv. 200; I7 MICH. L. REv. 407. Another group of analogous cases is to be
found where the beneficiaries of a life insurance policy excepting death by the
hand of the insured are allowed to recover where the deceased was insane
at the time he took his life. Traveled bis. Co .. v. Mellick, 65 Fed. I78; Acc.
Ins. Co. v. Crandal, I20·U. S. 527; Ea.stabrook v. Union Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224The theory seems to be that the act of the insured in destroying himself
does not break the chain of causation and the injury is regarded as proximately caused by the mental derangement and not by the act of the injured.
INSURANCE-STRIKING OF TRUCK BY FALLING OF Scoop oF STEAM SHOVEL
IN LoADING AS A "CoWSION."-Autotruck was struck by the falling onto it
from above of the scoop of a steam shovel with which the truck was being
loaded. Held, such striking is a "collision" within a policy insuring the
truck. Universal Service Co. et al. ·v. American Ins. Co., (Mich., I921), 181
N. W. 1007.
The Century Dictionary defines collision as "The act of striking or dashing together of two bodies ; the meeting and mutual striking or clashing of
two or more moving bodies, or of a moving body with a stationary one."
The question of collision in an insurance cause arises only in marine and
automobile insurance. In marine insurance the English courts hold that
collision applies only to the coming together of two navigable vessels, and
does not apply to a case where a vessel runs into some stationary and permanent obstruction. See Hough v. Head, 54 L. J. Q. B. 294, and Chandler v.
Blogg, 1 Q. B. 32. In the United States it has been decided that there is no
collision within the meaning of that term where a vessel runs against some
sunken obstruction in the water. See Clive v. Western Assur. Co., IOI Va.
496, and Burnham v. ChiM Mut. Ins. Co., I8g Mass. IOO. However, a vessel
need not be in motion at the time of collision. See The M o;;ey, I7 Fed. Cas.
940, where the injured vessel was moored to the pier and was damaged by
the other vessel pushing her against the wharf; Wright v. Brown, 4 Ind. 95,
where the injured vessel was moored to the wharf and was sunk by the vio-
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lent waves caused by the defendant's steamboat, such being held a collision,
not by the one running upon the other, but by forcing some other object
upon it; Lomum Assurance v. Campanhia De Moageiis, 167 U. S. 14g, where
the vessel all loaded and ready to sail was still at the dock. That the colliding object need not be on the same horizontal plane for a collision to oc•
cur, was decided in the principal case. In Rouse v. St. Paul Fire & Marine
Co., (Mo. App.), 219 S. W. 688, where the automobile skidded off al\ embankment and struck the ground below, this was held to be a collision, and in
Wetherill v. Williamsburgh City Fire Ins. Co., 6o Pa. Super. Ct. 37, where
the car was backed into an open elevator shaft, there was a collision, within
the meaning of the insurance policy, with the floor below. Also there was
a collision, within the insurance policy, with the water in Harris v. Am. Casualty Co. of Reading, 83 N. J. Law, 641, when the car ran through the bridge
rail and fell into the stream below. Cases contrary are O'Leary v. St.
Paul Fire & Marine fas. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 1g6 S. W. 575, and Weltengel
v. United States "Lloyds," 157 Wis. 433. In the principal case reference is
made to Bell v. American Ins. Co. (Wis., 1921), 181 N. W. 733, decided but
a short time before, which held that the tipping over of an automobile in
the highway is not a collision between it and the roadbed within a similar
clause in the policy. These cases cannot be reconciled and considering the
dictionary definition and the probable intention of the insured, and that the
contract is to be most strongly construed against the insurer, the Michigan
decision seems the more logical and just.
MARRIAG<:-M1sR£PRr:StNTATION As TO NA"MO: AND CoNDITION. - The defendant falsely represented that he was from Alaska and that his financial
and social positions were good. He married the petitioner under an assumed
name with the very purpose of temporarily cohabiting with her and then disappearing without leaving any trace by which he might be located. After
a brief time he deserted her and she petitions for annulment of the marriage
on the ground of fraud. Held, that the petition must be denied. Chipman
\". Johnsto1i, (Mass., 1921), 130 N. E. 65.
Not every error or mistake into which an innocent party to a marriage
may fall, even though induced by false statements or practices will afford
grounds for its annulment. Fraud, in order that it be ground for annulment,
must go to the very essence of the marriage contract. See the leading case
of Reynolds v. Reynolds, 3 Allen 6o5. Where, as there pointed out, "there
is no mistake as to the identity of the person, any error or misapprehension
as to personal traits or attributes, or concerning the position or circumstances
in life of a party, is deemed wholly immaterial, and furnishes no good cause
for divorce." Here there is no doubt that wicked deception was perpetrated
upon the petitioner, and the false representations would have justified her
in breaking an agreement to marry if she had ascertained the facts in time.
V01~ Houten v. Morse, 162 Mass. 414 But after the marriage and cohabitation occurred a status was created which the law must protect. See Foss v.
Foss, 12 Allen 26; Vo11dal v. Vondal, 175 Mass. 383; Commonwealth v. Sha-
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man, 223 Mass. 62. ln the following cases the validity of the marriage was
upheld wher<' one of the parties assumed a false name: Meyer v. Meyer,
7 Ohio Dec 627. King v. Inhabitants of Burton on Trent, 3 M. & S. 537;
King v. lnhabita1its of Billinghurst, 3 M. & S. 250. In a note to the last case
are a number of decisions to the contrary, but these do not need to be considered, for they rest on the peculiar terms of the Marriage Act of England. The strict rule has been somewhat relaxed in some jurisdictions either
by statute or by judicial decision. See Da'Vis v. Davis, 90 N. J. Eq. 158;
Parsons v. Parsons, 68 Vt. 95; Gatto v. Gatto, 79 N. H. 177- The New York
courts especially are extremely liberal. See the leading case of Di Lorrenzo
v. Di Lorrenzo, 174 N. Y. 467; See also Robert v. Robert, 87 Misc. Rep. 629,
where there was a false representation as to financial conditions as in the
instant case and yet the court reached a contrary decision. In the instant
case the man the petitioner married was the human being she intended to
marry. The false representations concerned only the respondent's position
or circumstances in life. The fraud was not such as would prevent the party
entering into the marriage relation, or having entered into it, would preclude
the performance of the marital duties. Therefore, the court in the instant
case, in accordance with the strict rule followed in Massachusetts, properly
refused relief. See Day v. IJo.y, 236 Mass. 362; and Trask v. Trask, II4 Me. 60.
MAsn:& AND StRVANT-MAsn:&'s LIABn.ITY tc>R Wu.Fur, ToR'l'S ol"

Sav-

AN'L'.-Money had been sent to the plaintiff through the defendant telegraph
company. While the latter's messenger was delivering it to the plaintiff at
her home, he made an indecent proposal to her. Held, (two justices dissenting), the defendant is liable for the misconduct of its messenger. Buchanan
v. Western Union T.elegraph Co., (So. Car., 1!)20), 100 S. E. 159·
Generally a master is liable for the wilful or malicious tort of his servant
only when the act is within the scope of his employment and in furtherance
of the master's business. Illinois Central Railroad v. Ross, 31 Ill. App. 170.
These limitations on the master's liability are not recognized where he owes
a special duty of protection to the injured party. The duty may be founded
on contract * * * as between carrier and passenger, or innkeeper and guest.
Craker v. C. & N. W. Ry. Co., 36 Wis. 657; Birmingham Railway L. & P.
Co. v. Parker, 161 Ala. 248; Savannah F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Qua, ro3 Ga. 125;
Clancy v. Barker 71 Neb. 83. The duty may be imposed for reasons of public policy, as in cases where the master entrusts the control of a dangerous
object or instrumentality to his servant. Railway v. Shields, 47 Ohio St. 387.
On similar considerations of policy, express companies and proprietors of
stores, shops and theatres have been held liable for the wilful torts of their
servants committed against those coming to their places of business as patrons, though the servant was not acting within the scope of his employment nor in furtherance of his master's business. See Dickson v. TValdron,
135 Ind. 507; Rkhberger v. Americaii E~press Co., 73 Miss. ~61; Brooks v.
Jennings County etc. Ass'n., 35 Ind. App. 221. Though the "ratio decidendi''
of the principal case is not definitely stated, it rests primarily on grounds of
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public policy. The court said, "The appearance of their messenger throws
caution to the winds and opens almost every door. May it admit with impunity, a thief, a murderer, or a rapist?" It seems advisable to place such
decisions squarely on the ground of public policy and thus to avoid any misapplication of the principles regarding master and servant. See 2 lr.L. L.
Rmr. 553; 9 MICH. L. Rmr. 87; 9 id. I8I.
MuNICIPAI. CoRPORA'l'IoNs-OnnrnANce RtGARDING DANce Music.-Petitioner was imprisoned for violating an ordinance prohibiting after IO p. m.
dancing or dance-music in a room or hall within twenty-five feet of a residence. Upon habeas corpus proceedings, the ordinance was held invalid as
being unreasonable and oppressive and violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. E.~ parte Hall, (Cal. App., I920), I95 Pac. 975.
Municipalities have a large discretion in the enactment of ordinances,
and an ordinance enacted under the police power will not be declared void,
unless it is clearly oppressive and unreasonable. DILI.ON, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS, [5th Ed.], !)28. It is not possible to adopt a uniform and universal
rule saying when an ordinance is unreasonable, and each case must be determined on its own facts. An ordinance requiring all places of business to
close at 6 p. m. was held invalid in Ex Parle Harrell, (Fla.), 79 So. I66, and
a similar ordinance was declared invalid in Saville v. Corless, 4> Utah 495. A.
curfew ordinance prohibiting persons under 2I from being on the streets
after 9 p. m., unless with parent or guardian, is an unreasonable exercise of
the police power. Ex parte M cCaruer, 39 Tex. Cr. R. 448. In Barbier v.
Connolly, I3I U. S. 27, the court sustained an ordinance prohibiting washing
and ironing in public laundries after IO p. m., but the danger of fires furnished a proper basis for the police power. The same considerations are
involved in the principal case where dancing would be prohibited in private
dwellings after Io p. m. In commenting upon the unreasonableness 0£ the
ordinance the court said, "It should be remembered that even in these days
of bizarre extremes and freak abnormalities, the muscle-tickling jazz has not
yet succeeded in entirely excluding all sane dance music from the places
where the devotees of Terpsichore are wont to foregather." A city has
the power to require licenses for dance-halls. Conley v. Buffalo, II9 N. Y.
Supp. 87; Mehlos v. Milwaukee, I56 Wis. 59I. It must be noted, however,
that licensing is sustained on a power to guard the public morals. The playing of a piano accompanied by dancing and loud noises, until IO p. m. is a
nuisance that will warrant a temporary injunction. Feeney v. Bartaldo, (N.
J. Ch.), 30 Atl. IIOI. Public picnics and open air dances within limits of a
village cannot be declared nuisances in themselves under a power to define
nuisances. Des Plaines v. Poyer, I23 Ill. 348. A license for police regulation cannot be required of a dancing school where it is not required of dan~e
halls generally. People ex. rel. Duryea v. Wilber, Ig8 N. Y. I. See also 27
L. R. A. (N. S.) 357.
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MUNICIPAL CoRPORA'tIONS-lMPI.ttl> Powmts.-The plaintiff was run into
and injured by an automobile ambulance owned by the defandant. The city
had statutory power to provide hospitals for contagious diseases, and hospitals for inhabitants who by misfortune or poverty might require relief; but
no express power was conferred to operate ambulances. Held, that the city
was not liable for the accident, as the purchase and operation of the ambulance was ultra "Vires. Ducey v. Town of Webster, (Mass., 1921), 130 N. E.
53.
The powers of municipalities are special and are restricted to the public
purposes for which they are created. Akr.on v. McElligott, 166 Iowa 297;
In re Pryor, 55 Kan. 724 A municipal corporation's powers include those
that are necessarily or fairly implied in or incident to the powers expressly
granted. 1 Dar.oN, MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS [5th Ed.] 449. Erection of
halls for public meetings have been held to be within the implied powers of a
city. Bates v. Bassett, 6o Vt. 530. Under a power to abate nuisances, a city
may provide an incinerator to consume garbage. Kilvington v. Superior, 83
Wis. 222. Under authority to keep streets in repair, a city can not operate
a quarry outside of the ~ity limits. Don.able v. Harrisonburg, 104 Va. 533;
s~e also Schneider v. City of Menasha, n8 Wis. 298. Generally speaking,
municipal authority is to be strictly construed, and all reasonable doubts as
to the existence of. the power in a municipal corporation must be resolved
against it. Chicago Union Tr(J{:tion Co. v. Chicago, 199 Ill. 484; Meday v.
Borough of Rutherford, 65 N. J. L. 645; Minturn v. Larue, 23 How. 435.
The ambulance in the principal case was purchased for general use; the general tone of the court's opinion indicates that had it been purchased to be
used by paupers and contagious cases, its purchase might have been within
the implied powers of the city. If the dominating motive of the purchase had
been to care for the paupers, the incidental use of it for other purposes wo.uld
not have made the purchase invalid. In Wheelock v. City of Lowell, 1g6
Mass. 220, it was held that the fact that a public building was occasionally
used for other than a public purpose, did not make the building any the less
public. After deciding that the purchase of the ambulance was ultra vires,
the court adopted the rule that a city is not liable for its 1tltra 'Vires acts. This
rule is undoubtedly supported by the weight of authority but has been greatly
criticized; Jo~s, NEGUGSNC~ OF MuNICIPAI. CORPORATIONS, 173. says that it,
in effect, punishes a third person, who is in no way responsible for the unauthorized act; this phase of the problem is discussed in Salt Lake City v.
Hollister, n8 U. S. 256.
NtGI.IG~NC:E-llis IPSA LoQUlTUR.-Plaintiff, upon defendant's invitation
and under guidance of one of defendant's employees, was making a tour of
defendant's plant. While plaintiff was watching another employee label bottles of "Bevo," one of the bottles exploded, a piece of the glass striking and
cutting the. end of plaintiff's nose. The wound healed quickly, but the shape
·and appearance of plaintiff's nose was permanently ruined. She was a nineteen-year-old girl. Plaintiff's case was based entirely upon the presumption
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of negligence. Held, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies. Riecke v. Anheuser-Busch Brewing Ass'n, (Mo., I!)2I), 2ZJ S. W. 63I.
While the cases to which this doctrine is now applied are so numerous
and diverse and the authorities so conflicting that to attempt a statement of
definite limits is dangerous, yet certain essentials seem to be quite generally
recognized. The thing causing the injury must be under the exclusive control of the defendant, the accident must be such as does not ordinarily happen if proper care is exercised, the plaintiff must have been rightfully in the
place where the injury was received, and specific proof of the cause of the
injury must be wanting. When applicable, the effect is that plaintiff may
submit the issue of negligence to the jury upon proof of the injury only.
SAI.MOND ON ToRTS, [5th Ed.], 34 Plaintiff still has the burden of proof.
Sweeney v. Erving, z.z8 U. S. 233. The doctrine was formerly applied only
in cases where defendant was practically an insurer under a contractual relation with plaintiff, Cosulich et al v. S. O. Co., &122 N. Y. n8, and it is still
so limited in some courts, Duerber M'fg. Co. v. Dullnig, (Tex., IQ04), 83
S. W. 88g, which case further restricts it to cases of falling objects. Of the
cases wherein plaintiff's injury was caused by the explosion of a soft drink
bottle, the best authority for the instant case is Payne v. Rome Coca-Cola
Bottling Co., IO Ga. App. 762, which, indeed, goes much farther than the
principal case, for there the offending bottle had passed through several hands
and was in possession of a retailer. The court held that there being no evidence of negligence on the part of any of the intermediaries, the inference
of negligence arose against the bottler. On similar facts, Dail v. Ta3•lor, ISI
N. C. 284, is exactly contra on the ground that the bottle was out of the
control of the defendant. Also on similar facts Glaser v. Seitz, 35 Misc. 34I,
is contra on the ground that the bottle of seltzer water was sold for just
what it was. Plaintiff failed to recover for the loss of his eye in Stone v.
Van Noy R. News Co., I53 Ky. 240, because the court considered the injury
equally consistent with the theory of negligence or of no negligence, and
that, therefore, it should not go to the jury. On similar facts the plaintiff
also failed to recover in Wheeler v. Laurel Bottling Works, III Miss. 442.
On principle, the strongest argument for the instant case would seem to rest
on the fact that the bottler is in a position to know whether the product is
dangerous, and that no one else who will handle it is in such position. For
application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to passenger-carrier cases, see
II MICH. L. Ri;v. 53I. See also I6 MICH. L. REv. 205.
PHYSICIANS-DUTY TOWARD THOS~ LIABI.~ 'l'O EXPOS~ 'l'O AN INFr:c'tIOUS
D1S£AS£.-Appellants sued the two physicians in attendance on their married
son for not telling them that typhoid fever was an infectious disease and
for advising them to take him home and put him among the younger children. As a result, both of the appellants and three of their minor children
contracted typhoid fever, of which one of the children died. Held, although
the complaint was insufficient here because of failure to allege facts showing the negligence to be the proximate cause of the injury, a duty rests on

886

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

a physician attending a patient with a contagious or infectious disease to
exercise reasonable care to advise members of the family and others liable
to be exposed of the nature of the disease and the danger of exposure. Davis
v Rodman (Ark., 1921), 227 S. W. 612.
A legal duty resting on the defendant to use care or skill is an essential
element of actionable negligence. Curtin v. Somerset, 140 Pa. St. 70. The
leading effort to formulate this duty found in Heaven v. Pender, L. R. I I
Q. B. D. 503 (1883), is broad in its language. The court there said: "Whenever one person is by circumstances placed in such a position with regard
to another that everyone of ordinary sense who did think would at once recognize that if he did not use ordinary care and skill in his own conduct with
regard to those circumstances he would cause danger of injury to the person or property of the other, a duty arises to use ordinary care and skill to
avoid such danger." Although the courts have often quoted this rule, they
have, in general, held that there are but two classes in which a legal
duty arises : 1st, anyone in the exercise of his own legal rights is
bound to use ordinary care not to injure others (Colchester v. Brooke, 7
Adolphus & Ellis N. S. 377) ; 2nd, anyone undertaking to do something for
another, whether by express contract or otherwise, must act with due care.
Black v. N. Y., N. H., and Hartford Ry. Co., 193 Mass. 448. Although the
principal case is within neither of these two well-established classes it involves a probably not unreasonable application of the general rule in holding that a physician owes a legal duty not only to a patient or to one who
has employed him to care for someone else but to all members of the family
and others who are liable to be exposed to the disease. The only precedent
for this decision is the recently decided case of Skillings v. Allen., 143 Minn.
323, where it was held that a physician in telling plaintiff who had employed
him to care for his child sick with scarlet fever that there would be no
danger from contagion in taking the child home from the hospital while
peeling, was guilty of negligence. Although the court talks about the contractual duty of the defendant to the parents who had employed him, the
case is decided on the grounds of tort liability.
Ptrar.1c Urn.1ms-RAn:s-PowtR TO CoN'tRAC'l' UNDmt GRAN't 6F PowtR
TO FIX RA'!'Ss.-Certain Iowa cities passed ordinances conferring on appellants franchises to use the streets for twenty-five, (in one case twenty,)
years on condition that they should charge specified maximum rates. Appellant companies sought injunctions to restrain these rates, which for the
purposes of the suits are admitted to be confiscatory. The District Court
held the rates fixed depended on contracts, which the municipalities had
power to make, and decreed enforcement of the ordinance rates. Upon appeal, held, that under the Iowa statutes there was no such power to fix contract rates. Southern Iowa Electric Co. v. Chariton, U. S. Sup. Ct., April
II, 1921.
These cases carry a step further the development of the law of rate fixing considered in 19 MICH. L. R.Ev. 547, and other notes there referred to.
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The court clearly distinguishes between rates fixed by governmental regulation, and by contract. If a governmental agency having the necessary power
to contract enters mto a rate agreement with a public utility the rates so
fixed are binding on both parties as matter of contract, whether on the one
hand they are excessive, or on the other they are so low as to be confiscatory. As to the power of the legislature or a commission to override such
contracts see previous notes in 18 MicH. L. Ri;v. 8o6; 19 ib. u2, 547· But cf.
Ohio & Col. S. & R. Co. v. Pub. Util. Com-., (Col., 1920), 187 Pac. lo82;
Charleston v. Pub. Serv. Ccm., (W. Va., 1920), 103 S. E. 673; People v.
Ni:ron, l8o N. Y. Supp. I30 (I920); and Re Southern Pub. Utilities Co.,
(N. C., I919), IOI S. E. 619; Sapulpa v. Oklahoma Nat'l Gas Co., (Old.,
1920), 192 Pac. 224; Hoyne v. Chicago & Oak Park El. R. Co., (Ill., 1920),
128 N. E. 587. Such cases as the present depend upon the existence or nonexistence of b~ding contracts as to rates. The decision of Home Telephone
Cc. v. Los Angeles, 2II U. S. 265, was regarded as a great victory for the
public. Many foolish and wicked franchise grants to public utilities had
been made by legislative bodies to the great detriment of an outraged public.
This case held that such powers to a municipality to grant franchises were
to be strictly construed, and that power "to fix and determine the price of
gas and electric light" did not authorize the municipality to abandon that
power, and to establish irrevocably rates for the entire period of the franchise. As has so often happened in contests between the public and the utilities after events have turned rejoicing into weeping. While conditions favored lowering of franchise rates the public rejoiced in this decision. But
now that every utility is seeking higher than franchise rates the role is invoked to plague the public. Statutes and decisions, or a combination of the
two, intended as shields of defense turn out to be swords of attack. So
here. To prevent profligate grants of rights many states, by statute or constitution, provided that the right to fix rates and regulate public utilities shall
not be abridged, or that no irrevocable or uncontrollable grant shall be made.
There was such a statute in Iowa, and the court found that this established
"total want of power of the municipalities to contract for rates." The cases,
then, were to be decided, not on the ground of contract obligation, but under
governmental power to regulate. As the franchise rates· were conceded to
be confiscatory the decisions in their favor were reversed. On the same day
the court reached the same conclusion in City of San Antonio v. San Antonio Pub. Serv. Co. The Texas restriction is in the Constitution, but the
Constitution grants "home rule" to cities. This does not affect this question,
See also Detroit v. Michigan R. Com., (Mich., 1920), 177 N. W. 3o6. There
was no express or implied power in the city to make such a contract. H-0me
Telephone Co. v. Los A1igeles, 2II U. S. 265, 273, does not mean that "limitations by contract on the power of government to regulate rates to be
charged by a public service corporation are to be implied for the purpose of
sustaining the confiscation of private property." In any case if the utility
and the municipality agree to abrogate the rate contract the private user has
no vested interest in it that will enable him to enforce the rate for his service. Phelps v. Logan Nat'{ Gas and Fuel Co., (Ohio, 1!)20), 128 N. E. 58.
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QuASI CoN'J.'RACTS - ~\'UY :FOR WoRX PiRroRMtn UND~ M1s'J.'AKt. Plaintiff was under contract with the postal authorities to transport the mails
between the post office and the defendant company's trains. The relations of
the plaintiff with the defendant were controlled by the postal regulations,
which provide that railroad companies shall place their mail cars at points
accessible to the mail messenger for wagon service, and that if the cars are
not so placed the company must receive mail from and deliver to the messenger at a point accessible to his wagon. Defendant placed its mail cars
at such a point that it was necessary to carry the mail across the station platform. Plaintiff did not believe it was his duty to do this work, but the
company's agent insisted that he should do it, and the plaintiff complied under
protest. Upon discovering that it -was not his duty to do the work he brought
this action to recover for the labor performed. Held, that the plaintiff was
entitled to recover for the work performed. Grossbier v. Chicago, St. P., M.
& O. Ry. Co. (Wis., 1921), 181 N. W. 746.
The colirt adopts, and incorporates into its opinion, the language of Mr.
Justice Collin, in Miller v. Schloss, 218 N. Y. 400, as follows: "A quasi or
constructive contract rests upon the equitable principle that a person shall
not be allowed to enrich himself unjustly at the expense of another. In
truth it is not a contract or promise at all. It is an obligation which the law
creates." It seems clear in the princip_al case, that the company had been enriched at the plaintiff's expense, and that the doctrine of unjust enrichment
was rightly applied. The fact that the plaintiff might have found out, by
proper inquiry. that it was not his duty to do the Wolk, cannot bar his right
of recovery. Devine v. Eawards, IOI Ill. 138; Rutherford v. Mclvor, 21 Ala.
750. See also WOODWARD ON QUASI CoN'J.'RACTS, page 16. The agent of the
company insisted that the plaintiff was bound to do the work, and the work
having been performed in pursuance of the agent's demand, the company
is bound to recompense him. Accord: McClary v. The Michiga1i Central R.
R. Co., 102 Mich. 312. Contra: Johnson v. Boston & M. R. Co., 6g Vt. 521,
on the ground that the plaintiff was merely an officious volunteer. The case
of Blowers v. Southern Ry., 74 S. C. 221, is a similar case on the facts presented, although in that case the work was not performed at the request of
the company. It was, however, done with the company's knowledge and acquiescence, and the court held that the plaintiff was entitled to recover ·for
the work performed. Columbus, H. V. & T. Ry. Co. v. Gaffney, 65 Ohio
St. I04, is hardly distinguishable, on the facts, from the Blowers case, but
there the plaintiff brought his action on the basis of an express contract.
The court held that there was no such contract and refused to allow a
recovery. While these cases are rather unusual on the facts, the principle
involved is one of common application which the' courts have recognized
constantly in deciding cases of this general nature. Dame v. Woods, 73
N. H. 222; Highway Com'rs. v. Bloomington, 253 Ill 164; Hamby v. Collier,
136 Ga. 309.
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SP1'CIFIC Pr:Rl"ORM~NC1'-CONTRAC'l' FOR SALt OF LAND-DtFAUI.T OF VtN-

IN MAKING PAYMtN'ts..--Defendant contracted to sell land for $100 down
and $1,300 to be paid at his bank on Nov. 1. The agreement contained a
clause providing for the forfeiture of the prior payment and all rights in
the land in case of failure to pay the $1,300 on the day named. V endee, instead of paying cash, delivered to the cashier of the defendant's bank a sight
draft drawn on his own bank and certified over the telephone. This draft
,was accepted by the cashier as payment although he had no express authority
to do so. Conveyance having been refused, vendee prays specific performance.
Held, not having complied with the conditions precedent, vendee is not entitled to relief in equity. Keller v. Garneau~, (S. D., 1921), 18o N. W. 779.
A number of our courts construe literally the "forfeiture terms of a contract for the sale of land. They consider that such provisions make time
the essence of the contract, and regard a failure to make payments promptly
in the face of such provisions as a failure in the performance of conditions
precedent. They argue that "a court of equity has no more right than a
court of law to dispense with the express stipulations of the parties in regard
to time in contracts of this nature where no fraud or mistake has intervened.
To relieve from such stipulations except on the grounds named would practically deny the right of the parties to make them." Heckard v. Sayre, 34
Ill. 142. The California, Indiana, Iowa, Nebraska and Minnesota courts incline strongly toward this treatment of the forfeiture clause, and under the
spell of these arguments a number of extremely harsh forfeitures have resulted. On the other hand, courts are not wanting to hold that time cannot be
made the essence merely by so declaring, if it is unconscionable to allow it.
In the striking language of the Michigan court equity will not "be ousted
of its jurisdiction, or refuse to relieve against the exaction of the pound of
flesh, although the parties have in express terms stipulated for it." Richmond v. Robinson, 12 Mich. 193. This is not a novel doctrine in the field of
equity jurisprudence. On the contrary it finds a close counterpart in the
treatment accorded the provisions of the mortgage. In each case the court
of equity looks with disfavor upon the forfeiture. Yet the analogy is not
quite complete because the right of the mortgagor to redeem bas become a
matter of course, whereas the right of the vendee to be relieved of the stipulated forfeiture and to compel a specific performance is still held within the
discretion of the court. The turn which this discretionary power may take
in a given case is governed largely by the relative weight of a number of conflicting considerations. If the sum to be forfeited is large compared with
the hardship on the vendor, if the vendee has been granted possession and
has made improvements, if he has been prevented from paying on time by
circumstances beyond his control, and particularly if he has been prevented
by the acts of the vendor, or if the vendor has waived the condition of payment,-all these are potent reasons for ignoring the stipulations of forfeiture.
On the other hand if the vendee has been negligent, or if the vendor has
particular need for the money on the day named, or if the property has increased in value since .default-these are possible considerations which in
Dt1'
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the discretion of the court may defeat the vendee's bill. See authorities collected in WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS, Vol. II, Sec. 791. In regard to the principal case, since the South Dakota co~rt has not hitherto committed itself
to a policy of strict construction, this discretionary power might well have
been exercised in favor of the vendee. The sum forfeited was not large, it
is true, but he had acted in good faith, payment had been made in a form
reasonably common in business dealings, and there was no evidence of fluctuating land value or other undue hardship on the vendor. The case may
well be contrasted with Compton v. Weber, (Ill., 192I), 129 N. E. 764, a recent Illinois case, in which a vendor to whom $3,000 of a $25,000 purchase
price had been paid, refused to accept a check in payment of the balance,
although that form of payment had been accepted for the prior installment,
and demanded legal tender at so late an hour that he well knew it could not
be procured. The Illinois court, although committed to the doctrine of
strict construction, refused to countenance what it termed "a sharp business
trick'' by the vendor, especially since the latter had, by accepting a check for
the prior payment, led the vendee to believe that the same form of payment
would be accepted again. In the Illinois case the sum which would have
been forfeited was greater but on principle it would seem that the principal
case should reach the same result.
STAWTORY CoNSTRUCTION-U. S. MAIL Box NOT A "PosT OFF1CF.;1 "BRANCH
PosT OFF1cs," OR "PosT OFFics STATION."-A copy of a summons, complaint,
affidavits, and order for publication which had been sealed up in an envelope
directed to defendant, a foreign corporation, were deposited, in a letter box
maintained by the United States government in an office building. A statute
authorized the order of publication for constructive service to direct a mailing at "a post office.'' "branch post office," or "post office station." Held, defendant's motion to vacate and set aside the judgment should be granted because mailing the summons by placing it in a post office box did not comply
with the requirements of the statute. B. Berman, lnp. v. Amer. Fruit Distr.
C.o. of Calif., (N. Y., 1921), 186 N. Y. Supp. 376.
By looking at the code as a whole, the court concluded that the Legislature intended to allow the summons to be mailed only in the three sorts of
places named. The term "letter box" was known to the legislators since they
used it in a different: connection as pointed out by the code itself in section
797. Consequently it seemed to the court that in the case of serving a summons the legislative intent that it could not be placed in a mail box was very
clearly expressed. A similar method of statutory construction is found in
McArthur v. Moffett, 143 Wis. 564
Tlu.AJr-INsTRUCTIONS AS ro DA.'MAGts.-The jury returned a verdict of
$I,500,-the amount sued for,-where testimony had been introduced for but
$597·90· The trial court instructed the jury that they should allow such
damages as the preponderance of the evidence showed the plaintiffs to have
sustained, not to exceed the sum of $1,500,-the damages named in the com-
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plaint. On review, held, by a 5 to 4 decision, the judgment of the lower
court should be reversed. Calbrick v. Marysville Water & Power Co., (Wash.,
1921), 195 Pac. 1027.
The courts have uniformly held that an instruction limiting the damages
to the amount claimed in the complaint, is not for that reason erroneous as
amounting to an intimation that the jury shall find for the full amount
claimed. Carpenter v. Walker, 170 Ala. 659; Chesapeake & O. Ry. Co. v.
Carnahan, II8 Va. 46; Caughey v. Peoria Ry. Co., 164 Ill. App. 455. On the
other hand, an instruction upon the subject of damages is erroneous which
does not limit the jury to the evidence as the basis of fixing the compensation to be awarded. Presley v. Kinlock-Bloomingto1i Telephone Co., 158 Ill.
App. 220; Ill. So. Ry. Co. v. Hamill, 226 Ill. 88; Weigel v. McCloskey, II3
Ark. l; St. Louis, I. M. & S. Ry. Co. v. Bright, 109 Ark. 4. The instructions
of the lower court in the principal case were framed upon the principles just
stated, and included nothing which was affirmatively incorrect. The question resolves itself then to a consideration of whether the court should have
instructed the jury specifically that the evidence could not permit of more
than $597.90 damages. The dissenting judges in the principal case said that
to require the courts at all times to keep in mind the details of all the testimony and to instruct the jury at its peril as to the maximum sum testified
to by any witness would place unnecessary burdens upon the court. The objection, however, would apply equally well to directed verdicts and non-suits.
It is a general principle of law that the jury must assess the damages in
accordance with the testimony in the case, 13 CYc. 235-238, but the jury
shouid have the guidance cf the court in the form of instructions on the
law of damages applicable to the facts shown, as will enable them to understand and act upon the evidence. 4 S£DGWlCK ON DAMAG£S 2661. The instructions should state the law as to the elements of damages in sufficient
detail and not by too general a charge. Southern Ry. Co. v. Cochran, 149
Ala. 673. The question here would seem to be whether the statement made
by the court as to the damages was so general as to be misleading in view
of the evidence which specifically limited the recovery to a point below the
claim in the complaint. Courts are not expected to give idle and irrelevant
instructions, and a jury might very likely assume that the judge would not
name $1,500 as the limit of the verdict unless he supposed that limit to be
within the scope of their deliberations. The fact that they exceeded the
amount shown in evidence but observed the limit specified by the judge, lends
color to the view that the instruction was misleading.
TRUSTS-INCOME FOR SUPPORT-DISPOSAL OF UNEXPENDED ACCUMULATION

oF INco:Mr:.-Testatrix left property in trust for her son, directing trustees
to use the income "or as much as may be necessary'' for the support of her
son during his life, the income from the estate to be used "solely" for the
son's personal benefit and not for the support of his wife or son. In a bill
for construction of the will, held, not a vested equitable life estate in the
whole income, and that on death of the beneficiary the unexpended accumu-
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lations should be distributed with the principal. Th11rber v. Thurber, (R. I.,
1921). n2 Atl. 209.
The distribution of the accumulated surplus necessarily depends upon
whether the estate of the life beneficiary is vested. Rhode Island Hospital
Trost Co. v. Noyes, 26 R. I. 323. As to vesting the case is clearly distinguishable from cases where there is an absolute gift of income for support
until the principal fund is payable. Hanson v. Graham, 6 Ves. Jr. 239; fore
Hart's Trusts, 3 De G. & J. 195; Boothi v. Booth, 4 Ves. Jr. 399; and from
cases where the whole income is expressly given, subject to discretion as to
time and terms of payment. Endicott v. Univ. of Va., 182 Mass. 156. But
see Iasigi v. Shaw, 167 Mass 328. The fact that there was no provision made
for disposal of the surplus does not make it a gift of the entire income.
bi re Sanderson's Trost, 3 K. & J. 497. But in view of the language used
in the will in the instant case, there is at least some basis for the guardian's
contention that the testatrix intended the whole income to go to the beneficiary. As to disposal of unexpended accumulations of income, the general rule is that "they follow the fate of the principal." Hanson v. Graham,
supra. If the principal fund or whole income has vested, the accumulations
go to the life beneficiary, and on his death to his executor or administrator.
Rhode Island Hospital Trost Co. v. N-0yes, supra (see for collection of authorities); Bayard v. Atkins, IO Pa. St. 15. But in In re Sanderson's Trust,
supra, where the gift of income was npt vested, the court made a distinction
between surplus of income arising from personal estate and that arising out
of real estate, holding that the former went, on death of the life beneficiary,
with the principal fund, and the latter to the testator's heir at law. This distinction does not appear to have been recognized in the instant case. Nor
was it noticed in Demeritt v. Young, 72 N. H. 202 (no authorities cited),
where the direction was to pay as much as might be "actually necessary for
comfort and support," the court holding that the unexpended accumulation
of income went to the remainderman. On the rights of the life tenant and
remainderman in dividends, see PERRY, TRUSTS, Secs. 544, 545.
TRUSTS-RESUI.TING TuusT IN MORTGAGE Lnm ON PAYMENT TO R.!>DES.>.!
FROM FoREcr.osu!U).-The mortgagees had been awarded a judgment of foreclosure and the land had been sold to satisfy the judgment. The mortgagor
being una.ble to raise sufficient funds to redeem, the defendant furnished
19/28 of the necessary funds. The mortgagor redeemed. In an action by
the mortgagor to quiet title, the defendant cross-complained for an undivided 1g/28 interest in the land on the theory of a resulting trust arising from
his contribution to the redemption money. Held, that no resulting trust
arises, the doctrine not being applicable to the case at bar. Cochran v. Cochran, (Wash., 1921), 195 Pac. 224In so far as the court's decision rested upon the nature of the mortgage
as being merely a lien, it would seem that no valid distinction can be taken
between resulting trusts arising in lien or in title theory states. In Tobili v.
Tobi11, 139 Wis. 494, it was held in a lien theory state that where one uses
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another's money to make a loan and takes the mortgage in his own name, a
resulting trust arises in favor of the one furnishing the money. A similar
result has been reached under the title theory. Tillman v. Murell, 120 Ala.
239. On the other hand, it has been decided that where A's money has been
used to pay off a second payment of a purchase money mortgage, no resulting trust arises, even in a title theory state, and such a case has been distinguished by the courts on the ground that a resulting trust must arise at the
time the purchase is made and cannot arise subsequently." Jacksonville Bank
'v. Beasley, 159 Ill. 120. But the distinction seems unsound since the facts of
legal importance are those which exist when the mortgage is discharged
rather than those which led to its creation. 20 CoL. L. Rsv. 103. If the facts
of the principal case are approached from the point of view of subrogation,
t!te conclusion reached _would seem to be correct, since the facts fail to show
an agreement to reconvey or an interest in the payor liable to foreclosure;
JoNES ON MORTGAGES, [7th Ed.], No. 874 et seq. Conceding that the debt is
the principal thing, it has been held that a mere volunteer who pays the debt
of another may require the debtor to ratify or repudiate the payment, in
which case he may sue in his own name or in a court of equity as equitable
assignee; Crumlish Administrator v. Central Improvement Co., 38 W. Va.
390. It is submitted that the doctrine of resulting trust should not require
a fee simple to support its creation. If the decision in the principal case can
be justified at all, it must be on the ground that the doctrine of resulting
trust had its origin under conditions which do not exist at the present time,
and therefore should be limited in every possible way. See 20 HARV. L. Rsv.
555. At any rate it is clear that if a resulting trust did arise, it should be enforced only as to 19/28 of the mortgage lien and not as to an undivided interest in the land itself since the redemption had not been by the payer's
money.
WoRKMEN's CoMPENSATION-lNJURY TO WATCFrMAN AccmtNTALLY SHOT
IS Om ARISING OuT OF EMPLOYMENT.-A night watchman, employed by a
company which furnished subscribers with protection against burglary, was
killed when he was accidentally shot by a police officer then in the pursuit of
burglars, though tJ!ey had not entered the building which the watchman was
protecting. Held, (two justices dissenting,) that this was an injury "arising
out of employment." Heidemann v. A111erica1i District Telegraph Co. et al.,
(N. Y., I92I), 130 N. E. 302.
In Workmen's Compensation cases there are almost invariably the questions: (1) Did the injury result from an "accident"? (As to this see 19
MICH. L. Rev. 638). (2) Was it received "in the course of employment"?
(3)Was it one "arising out of employment"? The answer to the second question really depends on whether the employee was acting within the scope of
his employment. See references infra. As to the third question the prevailing view makes the test one of causation-was there any casual connection between the employment and the injury? See McNicol's Case, 215 Mass.
497; De1111is v. A. J. White & Co., [1917] A. C., 479; 12 MICH. L. Rtv. 614,
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688; 14 MICH. L. Rsv. 525, 526; IS M1cH. L. Rtv. 92, 6o6; I6 MICH. L. Rl(v.
179, 462: t7 M1cH. L. ~v. 195, 28o; I8 MICH. L. R!>v. 162; 19 MICH. L. ni.v.
232, 450. 458, 577, 669. That the injury in this case is within the law. seems
hardly questionable, since as the court so clearly points out, though the burglars did not enter the building which the deceased was protecting, yet his
very calling multiplied the chance that he would be near when danger came,
and in multiplying the chance, exposure to the risk was increased. He was
brought by the conditions of his work within the zone of special danger, and
the p~pose of the law was to compensate for this, as the court said in Matter of Leonbruno v. Champlain Silk Mills, 229 N. Y. 470. In Chicago Dry
Kiln Co. v. Industrial Board, 276 Ill. 556, a night watchman was allowed to
recover under the Workmen's Compensation Law for injury received in a
fight with a trespasser. In Ohio Building Vault Co. v. Industri'al Board, 277
Ill. g6, the death of a night watchman while on duty by being struck on the
head was prima facie evidence of assault and arose out of employment ·so
that there might be recovery.
WILLs-CoNS'tRUC'l'ION OF lU:PuGNAN't CLAUSts-IN'tSN't.-A testator devised and bequeathed certain real and personal property to a woman, to be
used and enjoyed by her during her lifetime, with full powers of alienation
without limitation or restriction, and upon her decease without issue to revert
back to the estate of the testator. In .a bill for a construction of the will,
held, (two justices dissenting), the devisee took an estate in fee, in spite of
the direction for disposition at her death. Gibso1i v. Gibson, (Mich., I92I),
181 N. W. 41.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Sharpe cites two Michigan cases which
he regards as controlling,-Robinson v. Finch, n6 Mich. l8o, and Cary v.
Toles, 210 Mich. 30. In each of these cases a devise absolute in form was
held to be limited to a life estate by a subsequent provision for a gift over
on the death of the first taker without issue. The sole question is, of course,
which clause in the will shall control. No rule of construction is better settled than that the intention of the testator, as expressed in the will, shall
prevail. King v. M ellillg, r Vent. 23I; Summit v. Yount, I09 Ind. 506; Lan-e
v. Vick, 3 How. 464 For this purpose the will must be considered as a
whole. Jackson v. Ho011er, 26 Ind. 5n. But when provisions of the will are
plainly repugnant, the testator's intent, the "pole star'' of testamentary construction, has not enabled the courts to render decisions that can be easily
harmonized. As between two repugnant clauses, some courts have ruled that
the latter of the two should prevail on the theory that what the testator writes
last in his "last will." Slnrrat v. Bmtley, 2 M. & K., 149; Hamlfo v. U. S.
E~press Co., I07 Ill. 443; Hendet'shot v. Shields, 42 N. J. Eq. 3I7; JARMAN,
WILLS, 6th Ed. 565. In deeds the prior clause controls. Cutler v. Tufts, 3
Pick. 272. This highly technical rule has been severely criticised, and is
never applied, it seems, except as a last resort. ScHOUL'ER, WILLS, par. 474.
See I8 MICH. L. R!>v. 785. The mere position of clauses or words should
not be conclusive as against the intention as manifested by the whole instru-
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ment. As Chief Justice Marshall said in Smith v. Bell, 6 Pet. 68, "both
clauses are equally the words of the testator, are equally controlling." If
then, there is no technical rule to be relied upon, the courts are forced either
to declare both of the irreconcilable clauses void or to find that the testator
intended one of the clauses to prevail as against the other. Every attempt
is made to avoid an intestacy. The most that can be said in an attempt to
harmonize the decisions is that in no two wills can the identical language
)Je found. The devise in the instant case is an estate to be used during the
devisee's lifetime with full powers of alienation, with a gift over at the
death of the devisee. It is said to have been the rule in Virginia for more
than a hundred years that such a devise creates an estate in fee. It is
known there as the rule of May v. Joynes, 20 Grat. (Va.) 692. In lgo8 this
rule was changed by statute, Acts lgo8, p. 187, (amending V. C. 1904, Sec.
2418), so as to give effect to the limitation over. See criticism of this statute, 14 VA. L. ~G. 161. It appears, however, that where a life .estate is expressly given, it will not be converted into a fee because of an-absolute power
of disposal. Mansfield v. Shelton, 67 Conn. 390; Ducker v. Buniham., 146 Ill.
9. In Jackso1~ v. Robins, 16 Johns. (N. Y.) 537, it is pointed out by Chancellor Kent that after a devise like that in the instant case and May v. Joynes,
supra, the limitation over cannot take effect as a remainder because it is
limited after an estate in fee, nor as an executory devise because it can be
defeated by an alteration or conveyance of the estate out of which it is limited. See also, lone~ v. Jones, 25 Mich. 401. In the instant case the words
taken in their natural sense create an absolute fee. Nothing can be done to
control the disposition of such an estate at the death of the devisee.

